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LITIGATING AN INTERNATIONAL OIL DISPUTE
Jonathan Wallace*
The rise of the OPEC nations and the corresponding change
in the international balance of economic power have led to an increase in litigation related to oil. Many of these cases have resulted
from attempts by the oil-producing nations to gain greater control
over their own resources, or to extract higher prices from purchasers. 1 Libya alone has been responsible for a disproportionate
*

J.D. 1980, Harvard University.

1.

One commentator has stated that
The Programme of Action on the Establishment of a
New International Economic Order . . . welcomed the

increasingly effective mobilization by the whole group
of oil-exporting countries of their natural resources
for the benefit of their economic development.
Such a welcoming note may be viewed as an
implicit tribute to the recent efforts of a small group
of States, mainly the Arab oil exporters, to change the
basic structure of the world economic order and the
interests underlying its governing rules.
Shihata, Arab Oil Policies and the New International Economic Order, 16
Va.J. Int'l L. 261, 261 (1976).
See Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3206, 6th Special Sess., U.N. GAOR, Supp. 1,
U.N. Doc. No. A/9559 (1974) [hereinafter referred to as NIEO] ; Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) [hereinafter referred to as Charter].
The nations supporting the NIEO, including the OPEC nations, assert

N.Y.J. Int'l & Comp. L.

[Vol. II

2

amount of the recent litigation.
Oil litigation cases may be divided into three basic categories.
In certain cases an oil company brings proceedings directly against
the oil-producing state. 3
In others, it sues an oil-producing or
-trading entity of the state. 4 In the third category, it does not proceed against the state or its entities at all, but against other oil
companies, hoping to affect adversely the market for crude oil
from the offending state. 5
The lawsuits in these categories have one thing in common:
full permanent sovereignty of every State over its
natural resources and all economic activities. In order
to safeguard these resources, each State is entitled to
exercise effective control over them and their exploitation with means suitable to its own situation, including
the right to nationalization or transfer of ownership
to its nationals. . . No State may be subjected to
economic, political or any other type of coercion
to prevent the free and full exercise of this inalienable
right.
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order,
GA. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
See generally Brower & Tepe, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States: A Reflection or Rejection of InternationalLaw?, 9 Int'l Law. 295
(1975); White, A New International Economic Order?, 16 Va. J. Int'l L. 323

(1976).
2.
See generally Blair, The Control of Oil (1976) [hereinafter referred
to as Blair]. Libya has asserted the Charter provision that
[i] n any case where the question of compensation gives
rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing state and by its tribunals,
unless it is freely and mutually agreed by all states
concerned that other peaceful means be sought on the
basis of the sovereign equality of states and in accordance with the principle of free choice of means.
Charter, supra note 1, at Article 2(2)(c). Libyan refusal to recognize the competence of international arbitral panels was evidenced in the Libya-Oil Companies
Arbitration of 1977. See Award on the Merits in the Dispute Between Texaco
Overseas Petrolum Company/California Asiatic Oil Company and the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, reprinted in 17 Int'l Legal Mat'Is 1, 27
(quoting the Memorandum of the Libyan Government dated July 26, 1974)
[hereinafter referred to as Libya-Oil Companies Arbitration].
3.
See notes 11-46 infra and accompanying text.
4.
See notes 47-90 infra and accompanying text.
5.
See notes 91-115 infra and accompanying text.
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they have virtually never succeeded. Doctrines such as sovereign
immunity 6 and act of state 7 have barred plaintiffs from success.
The doctrine that a sovereign cannot be sued without
its consent has been engraved deeply in our law and was
well recognized by the 18th and 19th century interThe general rule was pronational authorities. . .
mulgated by Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner
Exchange v. McFadden [11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116
(1812)], and was accepted without much question for
over a century.
Rabinowitz, Can the Courts Cope With the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act?, 1 N.YJ. Int'l & Comp. L. 130, 131-32 (1980) [citations omitted].
United States v. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520 (1875), presents a most sweeping
reading of the doctrine: "A sovereign cannot be sued in his own courts without
his consent. His own dignity, as well as the dignity of the nation he represents,
prevents his appearance to answer a suit against him in the courts of another
sovereign." Id. at 524.
A restrictive view of the applicability of the doctrine has developed in
the post World War II period: this theory states that immunity should not be
granted in cases arising out of commercial transactions (jure gestiones) but
should be retained in cases involving governmental interests (jure imperii). This
view has found expression in the Tate Letter, [1952] 26 Dep't State Bull.
984, and in the provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1330(d), 1441(d), 1602-11 (1976). It is submitted, however, that even
under this restrictive view, plaintiffs will experience great difficulty enforcing
judgments against OPEC sovereigns in the majority of cases.
The act of state doctrine is a creation of American courts, which
7.
arises
out of the basic relationship between branches of
government in a system of separation of powers. It
concerns the competency of dissimilar institutions to
make and implement particular kinds of decisions
in the area of international relations. The doctrine
as formulated in past decisions expresses the strong
sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in
the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state
may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit
of goals both for itself and for the community of nations
as a whole in the international sphere....
[TJ he Judicial Branch will not examine the
validity of taking of property within its own territory
by a foreign sovereign government . . . in the absence
of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding
controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges
that the taking violates customary international law.
6.
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On other occasions, plaintiffs have discovered that the defendant
and the transaction did not have sufficient contacts to the forum
to justify jurisdiction. 8 A state trading entity may escape liability
by pleading an act of state as force majeure.9 Finally, plaintiffs
who clear all of these hurdles may discover that no assets of the
foreign state are
available on which they will be permitted to exe10
cute judgment.
This article will examine some of the noteworthy recent cases,
most of which arose from the re-shuffling of economic power that
occurred in the Gulf region in the early 1970's.
Suit Against the State
Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic
Oil Company v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic," an
arbitration, may be the last great victory won by a plaintiff suing
an OPEC nation.
After his accession to power in Libya via a military coup
in 1969, Colonel Khadafy moved to increase control over oil production and to increase prices. 12 By decrees of September 1, 1973,
and February 11, 1974, his Revolutionary Council nationalized
all right, title and property which had been granted to the above
two companies in fourteen deeds of concession. 13 The deeds proBanco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423, 428 (1964) [hereinafter referred to as Sabbatino].
8.
See notes 63-66 infra and accompanying text.
9.
See note 84 infra for an example of a typical force majeure
provision.
10. See notes 3340 infra and accompanying text.
11.
Libya-Oil Companies Arbitration, supra note 2. See Lalive, Un
grandarbitrage trolier entre un Gouvernement et deux soci~tes prives
etrangeres, 104J. Droit Int'l 319 (1977).
12. See Blair, supra note 2, at 211-34 for a useful summary of the events
in Libya.
13. Libya-Oil Companies Arbitration, supra note 2, at 1, 4-5. Law
No. 66 of 1973 (the Decree of Nationalization of 1 September 1973) provided
for nationalization of 51% of the property, rights and assets arising under the
Deeds of Concession. Law No. 11 of 1974 (the Decree of Nationalization
of 11 February 1974) provided for the complete nationalization of all property,
assets, rights and interests held by the companies under the Deeds.
The first decree was directed against seven other companies, as well as
California Asiatic Oil Company and Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company, but
not against all foreign companies holding concessions in Libya. The second
decree was specifically directed against the plaintiff companies. While nation-
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vided for arbitration of all disputes by means of three arbitrators,
one to be appointed by each of the parties and the third to be
appointed by the first two. When Texaco and Calasiatic demanded
arbitration, Libya refused to participate. 14 The plaintiffs then
resorted to a provision of the arbitration clause which provided
that in the event of a party's refusal to arbitrate, the other party
could petition the International Court of Justice to appoint a sole
arbitrator. 1 5 When the plaintiffs petitioned the ICJ Libya responded
by filing a memorandum with the Court contending that nationalizafiled
tion was a sovereign act not subject to arbitration.16 1Libya
7
no further pleadings and made no appearance in the case.
On December 18, 1974, the President of the ICJ appointed
as sole arbitrator Rene-Jean Dupuy, the Secretary-General of the

Hague Academy of International Law, and Professor of Law at
the University of Nice. 18 On January 19, 1977 19 Professor Dupuy
issued an award entirely favorable to the plaintiffs.

alizing assets, these decrees declared the companies to be solely liable for debts
incurred in activities conducted under the Deeds of Concession. Compensation
was to be determined by a Libyan Committee; at the time of the arbitration it
did not appear to the arbitrator that "this Committee has functioned or that
its members have been nominated." Id. at 4-5.
14. Libya-Oil Companies Arbitration, supra note 2, at 4-5.
15. Id. See Raman, TransnationalCorporations,InternationalLaw, and
the New InternationalEconomic Order, 6 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Coin. 17, 53-72
(1978) [hereinafter referred to as Raman].
16. Libya-Oil Companies Arbitration,supra note 2, at 1, 27.
Nationalization is an act related to the sovereignty
of the State. This fact has been recognized by the
consecutive Resolutions of the United Nations on the
sovereignty of States over their natural resources ...
Nationalization, being related to the sovereignty of
the State, is not subject to foreign jurisdiction. Provisions of the International Law do not permit a dispute
with a State to be referred to any Jurisdiction other
than the national Jurisdiction. (Memorandum of the
Libyan Government, 26 July, 1974).
Id. at 27.
The United Nations resolutions to which the memorandum refers are
discussed supra at notes 1 and 2. The arbitrator rejected this reading of the
resolutions. Libya-Oil Companies Arbitration, supra note 2, at 27-31.
17. Libya-Oil Companies Arbitration, supra note 2, at 6.
18. Id. at 2.
19. Id.
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Professor Dupuy began by noting that the deeds of concession
and Article 20(1) of the Libyan Petroleum Law of 1955 made
international law applicable.2 0
On the substantive issues, he noted that "the right of a state to
nationalize is unquestionable today ...the exercise of the national
sovereignty to nationalize is regarded as the expression of the State's
territorial sovereignty. ' ' 21 However, he concluded that the right to
nationalize did not outweigh a state's obligation to honor its commitments. 2 2 He looked, among other sources, to Libyan Civil Code
Article 147(1), which states "The Contract makes the law of the
parties. It can be revoked or altered only by mutual consent of the
parties or for reasons provided for by the law." 2 3 He stated:
The result is that a state cannot invoke its sovereignty to disregard commitments freely under20. Id. at 7-9. The arbitrator relied on the reasoning for applying
international law which was developed in the arbitration between the Government of Saudi Arabia and the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO),
27 Int'l L.R. 117, 154-66 (1963) [hereinafter referred to as ARAMCO Arbitration]. In that arbitration it was concluded that while application of a municipal law not that of the sovereign party might offend the essential dignity of
sovereign power, application of international law did not. Id.
The use of international law was contemplated by the parties in Clause
28 of the Deeds of Concession:
This concession shall be governed by and interpreted
in accordance with the principles of the law of Libya
common to the principles of international law and
in the absence of such common principles then by and
in accordance with the general principles of law, including such of those principles as may have been applied
by international tribunals.
Libya-Oil Companies Arbitration, supra note 2, at 11.
21.
Libya-Oil Companies Arbitration, supra note 2, at 21.
22. Id. at 22. Professor Dupuy stated:
Even though, for a State, the decision of nationalizing is
an expression of its sovereignty .... does not the exercise of the right to nationalize know some limits? ...
[T] he decision of a State to take nationalizing
measures constitutes the exercise of an internal legal
jurisdiction but carries international consequences when
such measures affect international relationships in
which the nationalizing State is involved.
Id.
23. Id. at 23.
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taken through the exercise of this same sovereignty and cannot, through measures belonging to its internal order, make null and void
the rights of the contracting party which has
its various obligations under the
performed
24
contract.
Regarding the remedy, Professor. Dupuy held that monetary
damages would not be sufficient, and ordered restitutio in integrum, 25 a remedy even more unusual in international forums than it is
in domestic ones. As arbitrator, Professor Dupuy had no power
to enforce his award. He did, however, retain jurisdiction of the
to formulate a method for putting
case, and gave Libya five months
26
possession.
in
back
plaintiffs
In reliance on the award, plaintiffs brought, or threatened
to bring, actions against Libya or against third parties in a variety
of jurisdictions. 2 7 The New York Times reported some eight months
later, on September 26, 1977, that Libya had agreed to provide
crude oil in exchange for termithe plaintiffs with $152 million in
28
proceedings.
arbitral
the
of
nation
In the Texaco case, the arbitration award served as a sword
which the plaintiffs could brandish, forcing the defendant into
a settlement. As the case demonstrates, there are many advantages
to including an arbitration clause in this type of contract. By agreeing to arbitration, a foreign state waives its sovereign immunity
from jurisdiction. 2 9 Arbitrators deciding under a law other than
that of the United States do not have to wrestle with the act of
state doctrine, which is unknown abroad. 3 0 Even if United States
law were applicable, the act of state doctrine bars the courts of
the United States from sitting in judgment on the acts of another
24.

Id. at 24.

25.

Id. at 36.

26.
27.

Id. at 37.
See, e.g., Blair, supra note 2, at 232-33. When New England Petro-

leum purchased oil from I.Abya that had been lifted from Texaco-Calasiatic
fields, the companies pursued New England in a "hot oil" suit in Sardania.
See notes 47-68 infra and accompanying text.

See Blair, supra note 2, at 2.
See, e.g., Ipitrade International v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,
465 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978) [hereinafter referred to as lpitradel.
28.
29.

30.

See note 7 supra; see also Beyer, Commercial Obligations Under

the Act of State Doctrine, 8 Law and Pol. in Int'l Bus. 1093 (1976).
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state;3 1 an international arbitration tribunal is not a United
States
32
court and therefore should not feel bound by this doctrine.
In the last analysis, it is far easier for a plaintiff to get a favorable arbitration award against a foreign state than it is for him to
obtain execution of that award. 3 3 It is unlikely that the Texaco
plaintiffs would have succeeded in executing their award against
Libyan assets in the United States had they attempted to do
so
4
after passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.3
While the Act adopts the theory that sovereign immunity5
should be restricted to acts which are governmental in nature,3
the legislative history explicitly states that the Act was not intended
to alter the extent to which the act of state doctrine "may be applicable." 3 6
In addition, to obtain jurisdiction or attachment
in aid of execution of a judgment, the property nationalized in violation of international law must be in the United States "in connection8 with a commercial activity" 3 7 conducted by the sovereign
3
state.
The Act's requirement of a connection between the asset
to be executed upon and the original dispute would have ruled
31. See, e.g., Sabbatino, supra note 7.
32. An arbitrator deciding under international law is an autonomous
entity, not part of any legal system, nor subject to any state; thus there is no
state which sits in judgment on the acts of another. And where the state has
agreed to arbitration of all disputes, there would seem to be no reason why
an arbitrator should not rule on an act of sovereignty. The reasoning of the
ARAMCO Arbitration seems applicable. See note 20 supra. Arbitration does
not offend the essential dignity of a sovereign as suit in courts of another
sovereign might.
33. The Arbitrator in the Libya-Oil Companies Arbitration explicity
noted that matters of enforcement were "not within the jurisdiction of the
Arbitrator." Libya-Oil Companies Arbitration, supra note 2, at 8.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. (1976).
35. The Act provides, in pertinent part: "Under international law,
states are not immune from jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned, and their commercial property may be levied
upon for the satisfaction of judgments rendered against them in connection
with their commercial activities." 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976).
36. See H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin [19761
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6604. The plaintiff, then, may be able to assert
sufficient jurisdictional facts only to find that the court will use the act of
state rationale as a means of abstaining from rendering a decision on the merits.
37. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(3), 1610 (1976).
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1976) for the limited circumstances
in which the courts are granted jurisdiction over governmental acts of expropriation or nationalization.
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out every available Libyan asset except one: oil being brought
into the United States from the plaintiff's former oilfield. But
these assets would not have been available for execution either,
for one crucial reason: Libyan oil, by the time it enters the United
States, is no longer in Libyan hands; it is in the hands of the oil
companies, who have paid for it, who are innocent of any wrongdoing against the plaintiff, and who could reasonably argue that
they were bona fide purchasers of the oil. 3 9 Moreover, under
the modem theory of nationalization, as expressed by Professor
Dupuy in Texaco, Libya's wrongful act was not in transferring
title to the oil from plaintiffs to itself or a third party; its wrongful
act was its failure to pay. 4 0 For this reason, plaintiffs would probably not have succeeded in executing their award upon any Libyan
asset in the United States. Nevertheless, the tactic of attaching
oil shipments in the hands of third parties was frequently tried,
by the Texaco plaintiffs as well as by others, and is discussed below
in the context of suits against third parties.
While an argument could be made that the arbitration agreement was a waiver by Libya of immunity from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States,4 1 and that subsequent refusal to partici42
pate in the arbitration could not operate as a withdrawal of waiver,
the arbitration agreement would not establish a basis for attachment
of assets. 4 3 Although arbitration agreements have been recognized
as waiver from jurisdiction," they would not be deemed waiver
from execution upon state assets. 4 5 Further, even an explicit waiver
will apply only to assets used in commercial activities.4

39. An example of a case where a plaintiff might successfully execute
a judgment under the Act might be the sale by an American company to a
foreign state of an airplane to be used for ferrying goods purchased by the
foreign state, which was not paid for, and which the foreign state was subsequently foolish enough to bring into the United States.
40. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
41. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1976).
42. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(1), 1610(a)(1) (1976).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1) (1976).
44. See Ipitrade, supra note 29; see also Note, Waiver of Foreign Immunity: The Scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1), 1 N.YJ. Intl & Comp. L.
159 (1980).
45. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (1976).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(b) (1976).
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Libya had agreed to all of its arbitration clauses in the 1950's
when the balance of power was far different. It is less likely that
any OPEC nation would agree to an arbitration clause today. Thus,
plaintiffs are likely to be exposed to the broader range of problems
that may arise from an attempt to sue a foreign state in a United
States court.
Suit Against a State Trading Entity
Carey v. National Oil Corporation4 7 was one of the first cases
decided under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.
It arose from the Texaco/Calasiatic nationalizations discussed
above .48

In 1968, Grand Bahama Petroleum Co. (hereinafter Petco)
sought to secure a supply of low sulfur fuel for its parent company,
New England Petroleum Co. (hereinafter Nepco). 4 9 It did this
through a complicated series of transactions whereby oil pumped
from the Calasia/Texaco subsidiary concession was first sold to
Calasia's affiliate Chevron Oil Trading Co. (hereinafter COT). It
was then sold to Petco and finally to Nepco. 5 0 COT, invoking
force majeure, 5 1 cut off shipments to Petco, after Libya nationalized fifty-one percent of Texaco and Calasiatic's holdings in September 1973.52 Libya then transferred the nationalized Calasia
NOC),
concession to the National Oil Corporation (hereinafter
53
a corporation wholly owned by the Libyan government.
47. 453 F. Supp. 1097 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as Carey].
48. See notes 11-17 supra and accompanying text.
49. See Carey, supra note 47, at 1099. New England Petroleum Corporation is a New York corporation which, at all relevant times, was engaged in
marketing petroleum products to utilities on the East Coast. The two subsidiaries involved. Petco and Antco Shipping Co., were both Bahamian
corporations.
50. Id.
51 . See note 84 infra for a definition of force majeure. See also text accompanying notes 78-90 infra for an analysis of an attempt to invoke force
majeure when a government action precluded a contract from being fully

executed.
52. See Carey, supra note 47, at 1099. Libya nationalized 51% of a
number of other foreign-owned oil concessions as well.
53. Id. The NOC was empowered to engage in all facets of the petroleum business, including primarily the production and sale of crude oil. The
NOC owned concessions in given regions from which it was permitted to extract
oil.
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54
On September 10 and 12, 1973, Petco, badly in need of oil,
signed contracts with NOC under which Petco paid, respectively,
$4.90 and $5.20 a barrel. 5 5 After the Yom Kippur war, Libya
56
threatening a cut-off of supply, forced renegotiation of the price.
A new contract for $16 a barrel was signed in late January of
1974. 5 7 NOC made deliveries of oil through December 1975, when
Petco, in the process of becoming insolvent, failed for the first time
to pay for a shipment of oil. 5 8 On May 24, 1977, NOC, as Petco's
creditor, filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against Petco
in the Bahamas. 5 9
Carey, President of New England Petroleum, filed suit in
New York against Libya and NOC, alleging that the January 1974
contract agreeing to higher prices had been made contingent on
60
NOC's continued performance under the September contracts.

54. Id. Petco needed to replace its abrogated arrangements with COT
in order for Nepco, the parent company, to fulfill the crude oil needs of the
United States East Coast.
55. Id. These prices were higher than those under the COT contract.
n response to this altered situation,
56. Id. The court found that "[ii
NOC invited all its potential customers in Tripoli to submit bids for new contracts to supersede any then in effect." Id. at 1099.
57. Id. at 1099-1100. The Court found that:
Petco proposed to NOC a significant increase in its
purchases, at a price of $14.14 per barrel. (The bid
indicated that Petco would "meet the 'going price'.")
Negotiations continued until January 29, 1974, when
a contract was executed calling for a price of $16.00
per barrel for the first quarter of 1974, to be adjusted
subsequently.
id. at 1100.
58. Id. at 1100. In fact, oil was delivered to Petco throughout 1974
and 1975 under the 1974 contract for refining in Italy (during the embargo)
and the Bahamas. However,
[i]
n December of 1975, Petco failed for the first time to
pay on time for a previously delivered cargo of oil.
Despite attempts to reach an accommodation concerning both past-due payments and future deliveries,
Petco was unable to satisfy NOC. On May 24, 1977,
NOC sought be petition in the Bahamas to have Petco's
affairs wound up.
Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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This performance had not been forthcoming. Second, Carey alleged
that Libya had intentionally frustrated Petco's contract
with COT
61
by nationalizing the Texaco/Calasiatic concession.
The court held:
Neither Libya nor NOC is amenable to suit
in a United States court on any claim concerning
the contracts between Petco and COT or Petco
and NOC. There is room for substantial doubt
whether, in fact, Libya itself was at all involved
in either the abrogation of the old contracts,
or their replacement-allegedly under duressby the new ones. However, even assuming for
the purposes of this motion that Libya's actions
and motives were as asserted by plaintiffs,
Libya and NOC are not in this case stripped
of the sovereign immunity that generally
62
attaches to them.
The Foreign

Sovereign Immunities Act establishes a series

61. Id. Carey and Nepco brought a total of eight claims against Libya
and NOC. They were as follows:
Claims 1 and 2 are addressed by Carey (as assignee of
Petco) to the alleged breach by Libya and NOC of the
agreements of September 10 and 12, 1973, respectively.
Claim 3 is Carey's attempt to recover from Libya and
NOC excessive amounts allegedly obtained by duress
under the contract of January 29, 1974. Claim 4 is
brought by Nepco against Libya and NOC, charging
intentional frustration of the 1973 agreements of which
Nepco was a known beneficiary.
Claim 5 is Carey's claim (as Antco's assignee)
against Libya and NOC for excessive payments allegedly
obtained by duress under the charter contracts. NOC
is joined because it is claimed to have extorted these
payments as the price of its own performance. Claims
6 and 7 are pressed by Carey (as Petco's assignee) and
Nepco, respectively, solely against Libya, charging
deliberate inducement of NOC's breach of the 1973
agreements. Finally, claim 8 accuses both Libya and
NOC of having deliberately caused the circumstances
in which the original supply contracts with COT could
not be fulfilled.
Id.
62.

Id. This holding was with regard to claims 1-4.
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of exceptions to sovereign immunity, and a plaintiff must show
that his case falls within one of these to establish subject matter
jurisdiction. The only possible exception upon which plaintiff
could rely was that embodied in Section 1605(a)(2), which states
that jurisdiction exists where there has been an act outside of the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state, and that act has had a direct effect within the United
States 63
If anything is apparent about the nature of
the contacts between Libya and the United
States in 1973-1974, it is that Libya consciously
sought to reduce those contacts to nothing,
if at all possible . . . it is evident that nothing

Libya or NOC did concerning the 1968, 1973
or 1974 contracts could possibly have had
a direct effect of a kind that would satisfy
International Shoe. . . There has been absolutely no attempt by Libya or NOC to avail
itself of any of the protections of privileges
afforded by the United States ... 64
The case both illustrates the difficulties faced by a plaintiff
who must proceed in court rather than in arbitration and raises
63.

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976) provides jurisdiction over actions
based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon
an act outside the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in
the United States.

Id.
64. Carey, supra note 47, at 1101. Probably the majority of cases
decided so far under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act have dealt with the
problem of sufficient contacts and have failed to find them. See, e.g., Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). In that
case a Dutch corporation commenced an action for anticipatory breach of an
irrevocable documentary letter of credit established in its favor by the defendant, the Central Bank of Nigeria. The court found that the bank was an
"agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" within the meaning of the Act. It
then held that there was no substantial contact with the United States within the
meaning of the Act. Id. at 1296.
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(but does not resolve) some special problems involved in proceeding
against a state trading entity. Note, for example, in the first quote
given above, 6 5 that the court states two propositions which may
be mutually exclusive: (1) Libya was not involved in the abrogation
of the old contracts; this was done by NOC; (2) NOC, as well as
Libya, is entitled to sovereign immunity. If the second proposition is true, NOC is entitled to sovereign immunity only because
it is an agency of the Libyan state. But in that case, should not
Libya be held responsible for NOC's acts, making the first proposition false?
The relationship between a state trading entity and the state
may be crucial to a plaintiff's case in several respects. Ironically,
showing that the entity is identified with a foreign state will not
aid the plaintiff if the entity, itself, does not have minimum contacts as required by International Shoe. 6 6 Also, an entity may
seek to show that it is one with the state in order to claim the
state's sovereign immunity. 6 7 Or, by showing that it is separate
from the state, an entity may entitle itself to rely on an act of the
68
state as force majeure, releasing it from its contracts.
In Wetco Ltd. v. Libyan Arab Republic and Libyan National

Oil Company, an unreported Swiss case, 6 9 Wetco, a British company,
contracted to purchase oil from NOC. The contract provided for a
three-judge arbitration in Switzerland in the event of a breach.
Alleging a repudiation of the contract by NOC, Wetco carried out
a series of attachments at Geneva to gain jurisdiction over NOC.
Then, NOC having declined to participate, Wetco petitioned the
70
court to appoint an arbitrator to represent Libya and NOC.
65. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
66. See, e.g., Edlow v. Nuklearna Elektrarna Krsko, 441 F. Supp. 827
(D.D.C. 1977). Tie defendant, a Yugoslavian entity, did not have contracts
with the Northern District sufficient to justify jurisdiction under the standards
of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Plaintiff hoped
that by bringing the case under the Act he would evade this problem, but the
court, holding that the entity was not an instrumentality of the state, put
plaintiff outside the Act. Cases such as Carey, supra note 47, have shown
that plaintiffs will not find a more sympathetic jurisdictional standard under
the Act than they would otherwise; InternationalShoe reigns everywhere.
67. As NOC did, in effect, in its defense in Carey, supra note 47.
68. See notes 78-90 infra and accompanying text.
69. 1978 Holding of Cour de Justice of Geneva, a copy of which is
in the author's possession.
70. Id. at 4.
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The lower court appointed an arbitrator for NOC but declined
to hold that the state was a party to the arbitration. On appeal,
the Cour de Justice reversed, finding two facts particularly significant. First, the Libyan government had controlled NOC's litigation
of the case at every step of the way. Second, Libya has sought
to show NOC's status as a trading entity, in claiming that NOC
was forbidden to arbitrate by a 1970 law directed at all state agencies
and entities. 7 1 Libya had demonstrated to the court's satisfaction
that NOC was subordinate to the Ministry of Petroleum.
The court concluded that, in contracting with NOC, Wetco
could reasonably have believed that it was also contracting with
of
the Libyan state. Also, Libya's behavior since the beginning 72
the suit indicated that it regarded itself as a party to the litigation.
the arbitrator appointed would repreThe Cour de Justice held that
73
sent both Libya and NOC.
Too much should not be made of this case. The outcome of
if any was held, is not in the public record. Even
arbitration,
the
(as is relatively likely) if Wetco received a favorable award, its difficulties in obtaining execution in Europe would be similar in certain
respects to those the Texaco plaintiffs would have had in the United
States. Although act of state is not known in civil law countries
and it is not clear that Wetco would be limited to executing on assets
which bore a relationship to the cause of the action, 7 " civil law
courts have imposed other restrictive requirements. For example,
there is some precedent in France for the proposition that a plaintiff
Id. at 5.
The contract of October 26, 1970, was concluded
under Libyan Law No. 76 of 1970, entered July 14,
1970; Article 1 proclaims that "all contract clauses
entered by the ministers, departments or agencies of
the State (public agencies) which imply the governing
of litigation of the above mentioned contracts by
arbitration or before judiciaries other than Libyan
judiciaries are hereby nullified."
Id. [The translation is that of the staff of this Journal].
72. Id. at 7.
73. Id. at 13.
74. As against the state. Note that where the defendant is a state
agency or instrumentality, such as NOC, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
permits execution upon any property "regardless of whether or not the property
is or was used for the activity upon which the claim is based." 28 U.S.C. §
1610(b)(2) (1976).
71.
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may not attach assets of a foreign state unless he can show in advance, that the assets are destined for commercial ends-a difficult
thing to prove. 7 5 Although a plaintiff who has received a judgment
or has an arbitral award upon which exequator has been granted,7 6
may proceed to attachment with the aid of a sheriff and without
further intervention by the court the attachment must still be confirmed in a referee proceeding. 7 7 It is not inconceivable that a
plaintiff wishing to attach assets of a foreign state might, because
of political considerations, fail to find a sheriff willing to assist
him.
A famous arbitration of the 1950's illustrates the situation
in which a state entity seeks to rely on the state's act as force
majeure. Jordan Investments Ltd. v. Souiznefteksport 78 was tried
in the Foreign Trade Arbitration
Commission of the Chamber
79
of Commerce of the U.S.S.R.
75. See Paulsson, Sovereign Immunity From Execution in France,
11 The Int'l Law. 673 (1977). The Cour de Cassation has pronounced two
contradictory decisions which remain unreconciled since stare decisis does not
exist in France. In Englander v. Banque D'Etat Tchecoslovaque, [1970] Rev.
Crit. 101, the court held that foreign state assets could be executed upon unless
the defendant could show that they were committed to sovereign, rather than
commercial, purposes.
In Dame Clerget v. Representation commerciale de
la Republique democratique du Viet-nam et autres, [1972] Rev. Crit. 312,
it reversed the presumption and held, without citing Englander, that assets
could be executed upon only if plaintiff could show that the assets were committed to commercial purposes.
76. Section 557 of the French Code de Procedure Civile allows a plaintiff who has obtained a judgment to proceed to an attachment of defendant's
assets that are in the hands of a third party (e.g., a bank) with the aid of an
huissier (sheriff). According to section 1024 of the Code, an arbitral award
upon which exequatur has been granted (section 1020 of the Code) is a judgment for purposes of section 557.
77. Id., section 557.
78. 24 Zeitschrift Fur Auslandischrat Und Internationales Privatrecht
449, 540 (1959); the arbitral award is reported in English in Domke, The IsraeliSoviet Oil Arbitration, 53 Am. J. Int'l L. 787 (1959) [hereinafter referred
to as Domkel.
79. See Domke, supra note 78, at 800-01. The Foreign Arbitration
Commission, consisting of P. E. Orlovsky as Umpire and M. V. Nesterov and
D. M. Genkin as Arbitrators, conducted a series of public hearings during 1957
and 1958 and rendered the Award on June 19, 1958. See also Berman, Force
Majeure and the Denial of an Export License Under Soviet Law: A Comment
on Jordan Investments Ltd. v. Souiznefteksort, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1128 (1960)
[hereinafter referred to as Berman].
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In the period from 1954 to 1956, Souiznefteksport (hereinafter
Nafta) provided, under contract to Jordan Investments and another
company, about thirty percent of Israel's fuel and crude oil consumption. 8 0 Then, on November 6, 1956, about a week after the
joint British, French and Israeli attack on Suez, 8 1 Nafta informed
Jordan Investments that the Ministry of Foreign Trade had cancelled
its outstanding export licenses for deliveries to Israel and would
more. Nafta was in fact attached to the Ministry of Foreign
grant no
82
Trade.
On October 25, 1957, Jordan proceeded to arbitration in the
Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission, claiming damages for breach
83
of contract and calling for delivery of 650,000 tons of fuel oil. 8 4
Nafta in its defense relied on the contract's force majeure clause.
80.

See Berman, supra note 79, at 1129.

81.
82.

Id.
See Domke, supra, note 78, at 801:
On August 4, 1956, the Corporation applied to
the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Trade, hereinafter
referred to as the Ministry, for an export license.
On November 5, 1956, the Ministry by letter
advised the Corporation that the licenses applied for
in accordance with the above contract dated July 17,
1956, would not be granted and that performance of
said contract was prohibited.
On November 6, 1956, the Corporation informed

the Company that the Ministry had advised the Corporation to the effect that export licenses for shipment
of fuel oil during the years 1957 and 1958 as per the
terms of the contract dated July 17, 1956, would not
be issued and that accordingly pursuant to the Force

Majeure clause (Paragraph 7 of the Contract), said
contract was thereby canceled.

See also Berman, supra note 79, at 1129.
83.
84.

See Berman, supra note 79, at 1129; Domke,supra note 78, at 801.
The clause provided:
Neither of the parties shall be liable for any damages
or noncompliance with the terms of this contract or
any part of these terms, if this damage or non.compliance is due to one or more of the following events
preventing one or the other party from performing his
duties under this contract in whole or in part: disasters
of nature, fire, flood, war-like sets [sic] of any kind,
blockades, strikes on the vessel carrying goods under
this contract, acts or demands of the Government or
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Jordan argued that Nafta's position within the Ministry meant that
the act of one was to be considered the act of the other. 8 5 Since
the Ministry had denied the export licenses, Nafta could not be
permitted to plead force majeure.

Jordan did not dispute, however, that Nafta, which signed
its own contracts, had independent legal personality 8 6 -a fact
that the Tribunal found significant in holding that the Ministry's
act had freed Nafta from its obligations under the contract.8 7 Partial
as this holding may have been, Western
courts in more recent cases
88
have come to the same conclusion.
other authoritative agency of the country under whose
flag the chartered tankers belong; ... due to any other
cause of whatever nature beyond the control of the
defaulting party.
Berman,supra note 79, at 1129 n. 2.
85. See Berman, supra note 79, at 1130. Jordan's argument on this
point was as follows:
It was urged, finally, that since Nafta and the Ministry
of Foreign Trade are organs of the same state, and
since Nafta, despite its separate legal personality, is
administratively subordinate to the Ministry, the act
of one is the act of the other and there can be no such
conflict of wills between the two as is necessary to call
into play the concept of [force majeure].
Id.
86. See Domke, supra note 78, at 804 for the finding of the Arbitration
Commission on this point. It stated:
[T] he Corporation is a self-accounting economic organization, an independent subject of the law, 4e. a legal
person conducting transactions on its own behalf and
consummating its own will in the form of legally binding relationships. The Corporation is not an organ of
the State administration. Therefore, the Company's
endeavor to identify the Corporation with the Ministry
lacks any foundation.
Id.
87. Id. at 805.
88. See, e.g., C. Czarnikow, Ltd. v. Centralia Handlu Zagranicznego
Rolimpex [1978] 2 All E.R. 1043; [19781 3 W.L.R. 274; 122 Sol. Jo., 506,
H.L.; 17 Int'l Leg. Mat. 1384 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as Rolimpex].
In this case the Polish State Enterprise, Rolimpex, failed to perform contracts
for the delivery of sugar. It relied on a decree of the Polish Minister of Foreign
Trade & Shipping which prohibited the export of sugar as force majeure. In
upholding the validity of this defense, it was noted in the House of Lords
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How one reacts to this holding depends on how the terms
are defined. From one point of view, the Soviet state should not
be permitted to get out of its contracts merely by having one of
its entities, the Ministry, order another, Nafta, not to perform
its obligations. 8 9

From another, even a Socialist state is not a

monolith; the personnel of a state trading entity may do everything
they can to carry out their agreements, including lobbying against
an impending action of the Ministry to which they are attached.
According to this view, a state trading entity would be barred from
90
pleading force majeure only if it procured the state's intervention.
Much will depend on how strictly the trading entity is bound to
and controlled by the state.
Suits Against Third Parties
Attachment of a foreign state's oil in the hands of a third
party, a popular tactic in the early and mid-1970's, was known
colloquially as the "hot oil" suit. Such suits placed indirect pressure on the foreign state, drying up its markets by making other
oil companies unwilling to deal with it. Plaintiffs undoubtedly
thought that by bringing "hot oil" suits, rather than by suing the
foreign state directly, they were avoiding issues of sovereign immunity and act of state.
Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum Laden Aboard the Tanker Dauntless Colocotronis91 disillusioned them on this score.
In November 1969, the Trucial Sheikdom of Umm, in the
Persian Gulf, granted Occidental the exclusive right to extract oil
in its coastal water for forty years. One month later, the neighbor92

ing Sheikdom of Shajah gave Buttes Oil Company the same rights.

that Rolimpex was an independent legal person under Polish Law: it was not
responsible for the obligations of the State Treasury; the Treasury was not
responsible for its obligations; it could not claim sovereign immunity; and it
had substantial freedom in making business decisions and in conducting its
day-to-day activities.
89. See Becker, The Rolimpex Exit from InternationalContractResponsibility, 10 N.Y.U.J. Int'l L. & Politics 447 (1978).
90. This view was expressed in the House of Lords in Rolimpex, supra
note 88.
91. 577 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978).
92. Id. at 1199. The boundaries of these concessions conformed to
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Controversy arose over a tiny island in the mouth of the Persian
93
Gulf, called Abu Musa, which was claimed by both Sheikdoms.
Occidental was already drilling near Abu Musa, when on March 25,
1970, Shayah claimed the island. On May 28, Iran also claimed
Abu Musa, and the National Iranian Oil Company, a state entity,
ordered Occidental to cease drilling. 9 4 On November 26, 1971,
Iran and Shajah worked out an arrangement dividing the island and
ratifying the Buttes concession. 9 5 On November 30, the British
protectorate over the Trucial Sheikdoms lapsed, and, that same day,
Iran landed troops on Abu Musa. Buttes began drilling immediately. 9 6 In June 1973, Umm terminated Occidental's concession on
the grounds of nonpayment of rent. 9 7 In 1974, Occidental seized
of oil from the concession area as they entered the
several shipments
98
United States.
The court never reached the question of Buttes' title to the
oil. It stated that
a determination of sovereignty over Abu Musa
is necessary to the ultimate resolution of the
right to the oil in this case. This question,
however, we hold to be a political question
Note well that
and therefore nonjusticiable.
this question would also have 9 9to be resolved
under the 'act of state' doctrine.
The court did not explain what distinction existed between
the two doctrines. The policies behind the two are nearly identical;
both require judicial abstention from decisionmaking in certain
The political question doctrine, which is founded in the
areas.
an agreement between Umm and Sharjah of 1964. Under this agreement the
island of Abu Musa and a three-mile territorial water zone were recognized
as Sharjah's. The continental shelf adjacent to the three-mile zone was recognized to be in the possession of Umm. Id.
93. In March of 1970 Sharjah issued a decree purporting to extend
its territorial waters to twelve miles. It granted Buttes Oil and Gas Company
permission to drill for oil approximately nine miles east of Abu Musa, an area
to which Umm had granted a concession to Occidental. These actions by
Sharjah "did substantial violence to the 1964 treaty." Id.
94. Id. at 1200. Iran also claimed twelve miles of territorial waters.
Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. ld. at 1201.
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constitutional separation of powers, requires the judiciary to abstain
from decisionmaking in areas committed to the other branches of
requires judicial
government. 10 0 The act of state doctrine similarly
10 1
abstention for the reasons discussed previously.
The Colocotronis court failed to explain why, having the
act of state doctrine to rely upon as a basis for decision, it found
it necessary to drag the political question doctrine into the international arena as well. The dicta of the court which addresses the
act of state doctrine indicates a belief that act of state is a constitutionally mandated doctrine, despite an explicit statement
to the contrary in Sabbatino.10 2 This dicta which raises the act
of state doctrine to the level of a constitutional mandate is unbefore the
sound; it threatens to place an insurmountable barrier
10 3
plaintiff who wishes to litigate in the United States.
The court noted that, as of the time of the appeal, Occidental
had attached some 120 shipments of oil. It enjoined all pending
and future litigation of this nature in federal or state court.
The Dauntless Colocotronis court relied heavily on Hunt v.

Mobil Oil, 1 04 which had been decided the previous year. Hunt
10 5
had shared a concession in Libya with British Petroleum (BP).

100. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
101. See note 7 supra.
102. Notwithstanding the statement in Sabbatino, supra note 7, that the
act of state doctrine was not compelled by the constitution, the court stated
that "the better view would be that the doctrine is constitutionally compelled
by the concept of separation of powers and placement of plenary powers in
the executive." 577 F.2d at 1200-01, n.4 [emphasis added].
This reading of act of state effectively places the doctrine within the
parameters of political question. Sitting in judgment of an act of state, then,
under this court's reading, becomes an activity constitutionally committed to
the executive branch. Such an interpretation would preclude the courts from
ever resolving a controversy centering on the activities of a foreign sovereign.
The court realized that this interpretation of act of state would render ineffective the Congressional intent, manifested in the Hickenlooper Amendment,
22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) 2370 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), that the courts not
invoke act of state to decline decisions on the merits in cases involving confiscations in violation of international law, absent a determination by the President that the application of the doctrine would be required in the particular
case. 577 F.2d at 1201 n.4.
103. Id.
104. 550 F2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977).
105. Id. at 71. The field reached a production level of 450,000 barrels
of low-sulphur crude per day. Id. at 70-7 1.
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After Khadafy had begun demanding production cuts and price
increases, 106 the seven "majors ' ' 10 7 met secretly in New York,
in January 1971, to outline a joint response to Libyan demands.
First they approached the Justice Department, which promised
not to prosecute on antitrust grounds but 10insisted
that the inde8
pendent companies such as Hunt be included.
On January 15, the companies signed the "Libyan Producer's
Agreement," which provided that if Libya cut back any company's
production, the others would make up the deficit on a pro rata
basis. If there was insufficient Libyan oil available to satisfy all
contractual obligations to European and American purchasers,
Persian Gulf suppliers would sell oil at cost to Libyan producers
so that they could
meet these obligations. Hunt was a party to
10 9
this agreement.
On December 7, 1971, Libya nationalized BP's half of the
joint concession and asked Hunt to market BP's former share for
106. Id. The Hunt court stated that this and other onerous agreements
which "were forced upon all the oil producers in Libya," were occasioned by
the "heightened militancy" of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC),
the ruling political party in Libya. The head of the RCC, and thus in effect
the undisputed ruler of the nation, was and still is Colonel Khadafy. (The
court refers to him as Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi.) Id.
107. Id. The seven major oil producers, all of whom were named as
co-defendants in the Hunt case, are: Mobil Oil Corporation; Exxon Corporation; Shell Petroleum Corporation, Ltd.; Texaco, Incorporated; Standard Oil
Company of California; the British Petroleum Company, Ltd.; and Gulf Oil
Corporation. Id. at 70 n.1.
108. Id. at 71. It was only after the Department of Justice imposed
this condition that Hunt, who was an independent producer, was invited to
join the secret meeting which produced the agreement that formed the basis
for Hunt's suit. Id.
109. Id. The court stated that the agreement provided generally that
if any party's crude oil production in Libya was cut
back as a result of government action, all other producers would share in the cutback on a proportionate
basis. It further provided that if there was insufficient
Libyan oil to meet contractual obligations to existing
European or Western Hemisphere customers due to
restriction or government shutdown, the Persian Gulf
producers would supply the Libyan producers with
Persian Gulf oil at cost, with an option to pay cash
in lieu of oil at a nominal sum per barrel.
Id. See also Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 410 F. Supp. 10, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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Libya's account. Hunt refused, and in early 1972, Libya took punitive action, evicting personnel from the concession, and cutting
Hunt's quota by fifty percent. Both Hunt and BP, pursuant to the
Agreement, received crude from other companies. Then, in October
1972, Libya demanded an immediate fifty percent equity participation in Hunt's remaining interest. Hunt again refused. On June
11, 1973, Libya nationalized all of Hunt's assets without
compensation.1O
In its suit, Hunt did not name Libya either as a defendant
or as a co-conspirator. Instead, it sued the majors, alleging that
they had combined and conspired to preserve the competitive
advantage of Persian Gulf crude over Libyan crude. By entering
into the Producer's Agreement, they had precluded Hunt from
reaching a settlement with Libya, as most of the majors themselves
did after Hunt was sacrificed. 1 1
The court found that the nationalization was a political reprisal
against the United States. The court stated:
We conclude that the political act complained
of here was clearly within the Act of State doctrine and that since the disputed pleadings
inevitably call for a judgment on the sovereign
1 12
acts of Libya, the claim is nonjusticiable.
Hunt had tried to avoid this conclusion by making no claim
that Libya had committed an illegal act. It argued, instead, that
the defendants had unlawfully induced Libya to commit a lawful
act.
The court stated:
The excision of the government of Libya from
the pleadings as a defendant or coconspirator
does not eliminate its action as a necessary
element13 in the cause pleaded in the third
1
claim.

110. 550 F.2d at 71-72.
111. Id. at 72.

Hunt also alleged violations of the Wilson Tariff Act,

which precludes conspiracies between importers
United States that are "intended to operate in
free competition in lawful trade or commerce. .
c. 349, 28 Stat. 509, current version at 15 U.S.C. §
112. 550 F.2d at 73.
113. Id. at 76.

of foreign goods into the
restraint of lawful trade, or
. ." Act of Aug. 27, 1894,
8 (1976).
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In other words, the nature of Libya's act was vital to plaintiff's
case, and the court could not "logically separate Libya's motivation
1 14
from the validity of its seizure."
The lesson of these cases is that a plaintiff cannot improve
his chances by suing a third party instead of the foreign state.
Although this may assure that he will not have to face sovereign
immunity questions, he will still have to confront act of state and
political question issues,
at least where the cause of action arises
115
from a nationalization.
Conclusions
In an old anecdote, a tourist inquires how to get from Manhattan to a certain point in Brooklyn, and is told, "You can't get
114. Id. at 77. In answer to Hunt's argument that since Libya was not
a named defendant the act of state doctrine did not apply, the court stated:
It is true that traditional and textbook definitions of
the act of state doctrine provide that courts in the
United States are precluded from inquiring into the
validity of the public acts of the foreign sovereign
committed in its own territory. .

.

.

However, while

the skilled pleader here has meticulously avoided the
issue of validity, its claim is admittedly not viable
unless the judicial branch examines the motivation
of the Libyan action and that inevitably involves its
validity ....
The American judiciary is being asked
to make inquiry into the subtle and delicate issue
of the policy of a foreign sovereign, a Serbonian Bog,
precluded by the act of state doctrine as well as the
realities of the fact finding competence of the court
in an issue of far reaching national concern.
Id. (citations omitted).
115. Another case involving Libya, in which the plaintiff sued a third
party instead of Libya, is more accurately characterized as a "banking" than
as an "oil" case. In Bosco Middle East Oil Corp. v. Bank of America, 343 F.
Supp. 1072 (SJD.N.Y. 1972) plaintiff, a Texas company, had arranged for
a guarantee running from the defendant to Libya, which Libya could call at
any time. In 1972 Libya called the guarantee and the plaintiff sued to enjoin
defendant from paying. The court held: "Plaintiff furnished the guarantees
knowing full well that payment could be demanded by the government simply
stating that the plaintiff is not in compliance with the law. The truth or falsehood of the charge cannot be a question for the banks to determine at their
peril. That was not their understanding." Id. at 1074.
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there from here." Similarly, an oil plaintiff may well discover that
litigation is a futile exercise. No Western national has formulated
a policy that oil nations and their entities should not be held liable
on contracts. The trend in the United States and in many European
countries has been toward greater accountability for foreign sovereigns in national courts. Nevertheless, disparate legal doctrines
such as act of state, sovereign immunity, and the rule of International Shoe combine to make life very difficult for the plaintiff
in an international oil dispute. Part of the problem is that oil has
been so heavily politicized. 1 16 In another field of commerce, a
cut-off of supply, or a forced renegotiation, might be seen as a
commercial tactic; but when oil is the commodity involved, courts
are quick to recognize, as the Hunt court did, an act not of commerce but of politics. This opens the door for the act of state and
sovereign immunity problems. A businessman contracting with an
OPEC nation assumes a tremendous business risk; when the deal goes
sour and the businessman finds himself a plaintiff in an oil litigation,
he is likely to find that the courts will afford him little recourse.

116. See, e.g., Int'l Ass'n of Machinist & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC,
477 F.Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979). The court held that controlling production
of oil was a purely governmental activity. Id. at 568-69.

